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# Firm Vietnam Decision Overdue

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 1, 1964

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, I believe the American people generally recognize the difficulties under which our Government, as the leading world power and main target of Communist hostility, must operate in the area of international relations. Our people have accepted their burden of heavy taxation, of disappointment and frustration over military reverses, and also tragic announcements of casualties with admirable fortitude. They ask only that their sacrifices serve a worthwhile purpose; point toward an attainable goal. But they do object to pouring tax dollars, and American lives, into a bottomless quicksand, in Asia, in Africa, or anywhere else. Evidence of dissatisfaction with a policy that accepts a long-drawn-out and costly stalemate is contained in an editorial published in the *State Journal*, of Lansing, Mich., August 25, 1964.

By unanimous consent, and under leave to extend my remarks, I would like to include this temperate, reasoned statement of what I believe is the present attitude of most Americans toward our operations and policies in Vietnam:

### FIRM VIETNAM DECISION BY UNITED STATES IS LONG OVERDUE

A Central Intelligence Agency officer's "serious doubt that victory can be won" in South Vietnam probably is shared by many other Americans in spite of the optimistic views expressed from time to time by various spokesmen for the Johnson administration.

The conclusion that no military end to the war against the Communist guerrillas in the southeast Asian country is in sight was voiced by Willard Matthias, a member of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, in a June 8 paper on "Trends in the World Situation."

Matthias said at that time that the Communist Vietcong had stepped up their offen-

sive while the counter guerrilla effort "continues to flounder" under poor prosecution by the Saigon Government.

In other words, the trend in the part of the world situation in South Vietnam was unfavorable, in Matthias' view, as of last June. There are no indications it is any better now.

Stating that "the guerrilla war in South Vietnam is in its 5th year and no end appears in sight," Matthias continued:

"The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.

"The counter guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because of the inherent difficulty of the problem, and partly because Diem's successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the inspiration necessary."

The CIA official said there is a chance that future development "could lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization," an idea that has been advanced by French President Charles de Gaulle but coolly received by the U.S. administration.

Matthias also said continued large-scale U.S. support of the antiguerrilla campaign and an end to "further political deterioration within South Vietnam" could at least achieve "a prolonged stalemate."

Neither alternative is palatable for the administration, some of whose spokesmen, following repeated but apparently futile visits to the strife-torn country, concede that the struggle will be long and hard but hold out hope for eventual victory.

The CIA officer's 50-page assessment of the situation was made available by administration sources when they learned it would be published in a Chicago newspaper.

This raises the question of whether it would ever have been made known to the American people upon the initiative of an administration which does not share, publicly at least, the pessimistic views expressed by Matthias.

One thing is clear. The unsatisfactory situation in South Vietnam confronts the administration with the responsibility of deciding without more delay upon a policy designed to bring the war to a successful conclusion or to accept a policy of neutralization, unattractive as the latter alternative may be.

As we see it, the administration should make a determined effort to avoid a prolonged stalemate in which Americans would continue to die and more millions of dollars in U.S. resources would be expended.